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Switching costs increase the rigidity of consumers  demand and lessen competition 
between  firms,  effects  that  are  particularly  relevant  in  the  mobile  voice  services 
market. This paper characterizes the most important mobility restrictive factors for 
consumers in this market, presenting specific examples and discussing their impact on 
competition.  In  addition,  a  survey  was  conducted  to  obtain  data  on  consumption 
decisions  by  mobile  voice  customers  in  Portugal.  The  survey  results  suggest  that 
switching  costs  represent  more  than  13  euros  or  57%  of  the  average  monthly 
expenditure with these services. The disclosure of a new mobile phone number is the 
most difficult task in the switching process. Customers also showed high concern with 
respect to the possibility of losing quality of service. Compatibility costs also impose 
high restrictions to customer mobility. Following the identification of these restrictive 
factors, the adoption by policy makers of remedies to address the different search and 
switching costs is discussed and their implementation prioritized according to mobile 
customers’ needs. 
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Switching costs are particularly relevant in the context of telecommunications markets as these are 
generally characterized by the presence of operators which own large customer bases and often 
adopt strategies to avoid customers’ switching and the consequent reduction of their market share. 
These strategies frequently inhibit the development of a more effective competition and may even 
pre-empt entry by new operators.  
In  fact,  according  to  a  recent  EU  Directive  on  universal  service  and  users’  rights  relating  to 
electronic communications networks and services: 
“In order to take full advantage of the competitive environment, consumers should be 
able to make informed choices and to change providers when it is in their interests. It 
is essential to ensure that they can do so without being hindered by legal, technical or 
practical obstacles, including contractual conditions, procedures, charges and so on.” 
(European Commission, 2009a) 
In the particular case of the mobile voice services, switching costs constitute a key issue as these 
services are near their maturity with penetration rates in most European countries already above 
100%.  This determines  that  most  of the  consumers  are presently  locked-in  to  a  given  service 
provider. Indeed, the churn rate in this market is very low, with only 9.5% of the European Union 
consumers  switching  their  mobile  voice  services  provider  per  year.
1  On  the  contrary,  the 
penetration rate of  mobile broadband services is growing faster and the proportion of locked-in 
customers is still small. Hence, given the larger detrimental effect of switching costs on competition 
in mature markets, this paper will focus on mobile voice services.  
This paper characterizes the consumer’s mobility in the mobile voice services market, starting with 
a  discussion of  the  most  important  mobility  restrictive  factors  for consumers,  presenting  some 
specific examples and evaluating their impact on prices, market shares and entry. 
Moreover,  a  survey  was  conducted  to  obtain  data  on  consumption  decisions  by  Portuguese 
telecommunications customers. According to the results of this survey, switching costs for mobile 
voice services customers correspond to more than 13 euros, which is equivalent to 57% of the 
average monthly expenditure with these services. If number portability is available, switching costs 
decrease to around 10 euros, or 44% of the average monthly expenditure. 
Considering the different tasks necessary to complete a switching process, customers classify the 
disclosure  of  a  new  phone  number  with  the  highest  grade  in  terms  of  the  effort  demanded. 
Customers also showed high concern with respect to the possibility of losing quality of service 
(QoS). The comparison of offers is another relevant task for customers. Compatibility costs are also 
imposing high restrictions to customer mobility.  
Finally,  a  comprehensive  set  of  remedies  which  address  the  most  relevant  mobility  restrictive 
factors  is  presented,  with  a  prioritization  of  their  implementation  according  to  the  revealed 
customer’s difficulties in the switching process. 
                                                 
1 See European Commission (2009b). The remainder of the article is organized as follows. A typology of switching costs is described in 
Section 2 and in Section 3 it is discussed its impact on competition. In Section 4 the survey results 
concerning the switching costs and the switching process effort are explained. In Section 5, it is 
presented a list of remedies that facilitate customer’s mobility, and, finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2.  A TYPOLOGY OF MOBILITY RESTRICTIVE FACTORS 
The telecommunications sector, as other service sectors such as banking, insurance and electricity 
supply, is often characterized by the presence of factors that restrict consumers’ mobility. These 
factors include costs related with the search and comparison of offers (search costs) and costs 
related with the process of switching suppliers (switching costs). 
Search costs include the set of costs faced by a consumer when trying to identify and understand 
alternative offers’ characteristics. They result from a lack of information transparency and from the 
consumers’ difficulties when comparing offers terms and conditions.  
For  instance,  the  difficulties  on  the  comparison  of  prices  may  result  from  price  heterogeneity. 
Regarding mobile voice services, prices differ according to the period of the day (peak and off-peak 
prices) and the distance (national and international calls). Prices also vary with the call receivers’ 
network, i.e. if the receiver of a call belongs to the same network as the caller (on-net call) the 
price is usually lower than if he belongs to a different network (off-net call). On the other hand, 
there is a wide range of types of tariffs, namely, linear tariffs, flat rates, two part tariffs (a mixture 
of linear and flat rates), or even multiple part tariffs that increase the difficulty of comparing prices. 
Switching  costs  are  borne  by  a  consumer  whenever  he  chooses  to  switch  from  his  previous 
service  provider  to  a  new  one.  These  differ  from  search  costs  since  switching  costs  are  only 
incurred when a consumer is already buying services from a given provider, while search costs 
arise not only when the consumer decides to switch provider, but also when he enters the market 
for the first time or when he “looks around” without switching. 
Switching  costs  can  be  categorize  into:  (i)  transaction  costs,  (ii)  contractual  costs,  (iii) 
psychological costs, (iv) uncertainty costs, (v) learning costs, and (vi) compatibility costs.
2 
Transaction costs have both a pecuniary and a non-pecuniary nature, with the latter resulting 
from  the  need  to  carry  out  several  time  consuming  tasks,  namely  the  celebration  and  the 
cancellation of a contract of mobile voice services. 
In addition to the previous tasks, there are other transaction costs related to the disclosure of a 
new mobile number. These costs may be substantial, especially for non-residential customers who 
have  to  contact  all  their  clients  and  suppliers  and  to  change  their  marketing  and  promotional 
material. 
Contractual  costs  are  generally  introduced  by  service  providers  in  order  to  create  switching 
barriers. These costs take the form of restrictive contractual clauses with respect to the unilateral 
ending  of  a  contract  by  a  consumer.  Consumers  are  often  obliged  to  subscribe  services  for 
                                                 
2  See  OFT  (2003)  for  a  general  description  of  these  categories.  Note  that  there  are  also  switching  costs 
associated  with  bundled  offers  whenever  a  consumer  has  incentives  to  buy  all  the  services  from  a  unique 
provider, instead of “shopping around”. However, and according to the results presented in section 4.1, mobile 
voice services are generally bought individually. minimum periods of time, e.g. from 12 to 24 months, as a compensation from having benefited 
from lower prices on handsets. Some promotional campaigns with rebates also require minimum 
subscription periods. 
On  the  other  hand,  loyalty  programs,  by  creating  incentives  for  repeated  acquisitions,  also 
constitute a contractual cost. These programs usually reward mobile voice consumption with points 
which may later be used by consumers when buying new handsets. 
Psychological costs are one of the most difficult categories of switching costs to identify. In fact, 
when a consumer engages in a long-medium term contractual relationship he develops a close 
“emotional” link towards his provider which may constitute a barrier when deciding to switch to an 
alternative one. 
Uncertainty  costs  emerge  when  services  are  not  fully  standardized.  Often,  consumers  only 
become aware of the services’ quality after purchasing and trying them, i.e. these services are 
what it is generally called “experience goods”. For instance, only after subscribing and making use 
of a given mobile network a consumer is able to realize the quality and coverage of its services. 
Under these conditions, switching to a new provider can lead to distrust by the consumer related to 
an eventual decrease in QoS. 
Learning costs are another switching cost category which arises whenever a consumer contracts 
a service from a new provider and has to learn how to use it. For instance, when switching from a 
mobile network operator to another the consumer has to learn the new access numbers to voice-
mail and to other customer support services. 
Compatibility costs are frequently faced by consumers of mobile voice services with SIM-locking 
being  the  best  example.  Indeed,  if  a  mobile  voice  services  consumer  wants  to  switch  to  an 
alternative provider and keep the same handset, he usually has to pay a fee to the original supplier 
in order to unlock it. 
Mobile voice services are also characterized by the presence of network effects. A service exhibits 
network effects if the consumption by different customers is complementary, i.e., if each customer 
consumption payoff, and his incentives to consume, increases as more others consume the service. 
In  the  mobile  voice  services  case,  the  network  effects  result  from  the  large  price  differences 
between on-net and off-net calls, so that when the customer’s most frequent contacts (e.g. family 
and friends) have adopted the same operator as him, this may constitute a barrier to switching, 
considering the bigger costs arising from the associated increase in the volume of off-net calls. 
However, and despite the importance of network effects in this industry, this issue is out of the 
scope of the paper, as its focus is on direct switching and search costs.
3 
3.  IMPACT OF SWITCHING COSTS ON COMPETITION 
All  these  mobility  restrictive  factors  increase  the  probability  of  a  consumer  keeping  the  same 
mobile service provider, even in contexts where other providers are offering the same service at a 
lower price. According to Klemperer (1987a), switching costs make individual demand more rigid 
                                                 
3 See Farrel and Klemperer (2007) for a distinction between switching costs and network effects. since  consumers  become  less  sensible  to  changes  in  prices,  therefore  reducing  competition 
intensity. 
Switching costs are therefore a source of market power to mobile service providers. In fact, two 
services  which  may  be  identical  with  respect  to  their  characteristics,  terms  and  conditions 
previously to their purchase become afterwards differentiated. 
Hence, the presence of switching costs has, by this way, an impact on prices, on market shares, 
and on market entry decisions. This impact must be evaluated from a dynamic perspective, taking 
into  account  the  presence  of  a  mature  or  a  growing  market  and  the  possibility  of  price 
discrimination between old and new consumers, as argued below. 
Impact on prices and market shares 
Concerning the impact on prices when price discrimination between old and new customers is not 
possible, there are two opposite effects, as identified by Klemperer (1995).  
On  one hand, firms have an incentive to take advantage of the presence of switching costs to 
charge higher prices to “harvest” the rewards from their locked-in customer base. As old customers 
are generally locked-in, they only switch to an alternative provider if the price charged by their 
current provider is higher than its rival’s price added by the switching cost value. 
On the other hand, and taking into account that in markets where switching costs are present the 
customer base has a higher value for firms as they are later able to charge higher prices, there 
may be an intensification of competition because firms have incentives to price low to “invest” in 
new customers. 
Accordingly, in the definition of its price strategy, the firm must balance the “harvest” and the 
“investment”  incentives,  being  determinant  for  this  evaluation  the  proportion  of  locked-in 
customers on the number of total customers. The higher the proportion of locked-in customers, the 
stronger is the first of the two incentives, and as a consequence, the lower is the competitive level 
in a given market. 
It is therefore natural that a firm’s market share plays an important role in the definition of its 
prices. As Farrel and Shapiro (1988) and Klemperer (1995) argue, firms with higher market shares 
tend to extract profits from their locked-in customer base since these profits are higher than those 
they could obtain by capturing new customers through lower prices. 
As a consequence of these different incentives, firms frequently adopt a strategy denominated by 
“bargain then rip-off”. This strategy, identified by Klemperer (1995), implies that a firm initially 
charges a lower price, with the aim of building a customer base, adopting higher prices at a later 
stage when customers are already locked-in.  
According to this strategy, in mature markets, the incentive for a firm to extract profits from its 
customer  base  is more  intense  as the  proportion of  locked-in  customers  is  higher.  In growing 
markets,  on  the  other  hand,  the  intensity  of  competition  is  stronger  the  lower  the  number  of 
locked-in customers. In this case, firms prefer to adopt lock-in strategies by charging lower prices. 
In  the  mobile  telecommunications  sector  it  is possible  to distinguish  both mature and  growing 
markets.  The  mobile  voice  services  market  is  near  its  maturity  as  penetration  rates  in  most European countries are already above 100%. In this market it is expected that the “harvest” effect 
prevails, i.e., it is more profitable for a firm to explore its locked-in customer base, than to invest 
in attracting new customers. 
On the other extreme, for mobile broadband services the penetration is growing  faster and the 
proportion of locked-in customers is still small. Therefore, the incentive to invest in the building of 
a customer base should be stronger, and lower prices are expected.  
Given the maturity of the mobile voice services as compared to mobile broadband services, and the 
consequent larger detrimental effect of switching costs on competition, this paper is focused mainly 
on the former.  
When price discrimination between old and new customers is possible, there is no need for a firm 
to balance these two incentives. In fact, as pointed out by Chen (1997), under these circumstances 
it is possible to offer lower prices to new customers, and at the same time to charge higher prices 
to  locked-in  customers.  As  a  result  of  this  discrimination,  the  definition  of  prices  becomes 
independent of a firm’s market share, and the “bargain then rip-off” strategy applies directly. 
One example of the application of a “bargain then rip-off” strategy in the mobile voice services 
market  is  the  subsidization  of  handsets  by  providers,  with  the  objective  of  encouraging  the 
purchase of the service and recouping those losses later by pricing above cost on voice calls. 
It can then be concluded that the presence of switching costs does not necessarily translate into a 
higher price level. In a scenario where price discrimination is not possible the combination of a 
price  below  cost  when  the  market  is  developing,  with  a  price  above  cost  when  the  market  is 
already mature may result on an inter-temporal average price higher or lower than the one that 
would be verified if switching costs were absent. When price discrimination is possible the average 
price can also be higher or lower than  in a scenario without switching costs depending on the 
proportion of locked-in customers on the number of total customers. 
According to Farrell and Klemperer (2007), the incentive to “harvest” the customer base tends to 
be stronger than the incentive to invest in new customers. Therefore, the average price should be 
higher than if there were no switching costs. Doganoglu (2010) and Cabral (2008) however show 
that, when switching costs are low, its presence in a market may give origin to lower average 
prices than in the absence of switching costs, since the “harvesting” effect is of second order under 
these conditions. 
Impact on entry 
One of the most relevant aspects of switching costs is their effect on entry, as stressed out by 
Farrel and Klemperer (2007). 
When switching costs are high, entry into a market with a high proportion of locked-in customers 
may become difficult. In these circumstances, an entrant has to charge a price substantially lower 
than the incumbent’s price in order to attract a customer base. This however demands from the 
entrant an investment level which it may not have the conditions to engage in. When switching 
costs are low, market entry may also be difficult since incumbents are likely to fiercely fight entry 
in order to retain their customers and avoid switching. However, and as suggested by Beggs and Klemperer (1992), when switching costs are neither too 
high nor too low, entry into the market can be facilitated by their presence, albeit on a limited 
scale. Indeed, when switching costs determine the setting of higher prices, markets become more 
profitable, and thus more attractive. On the other hand, and following Klemperer’s (1987b) and 
Farrell and Shapiro’s (1988) arguments, when incumbents are unable to price discriminate they 
may be more tempted to accommodate entry, focusing their commercial efforts on the extraction 
of profit from their customer base. 
In this case, entrants choose to adopt a “judo strategy”, which consists on entering on a small 
scale,  leaving  the  incumbent  free  to  explore  its  customer  base.
4  The  alternative  strategy  of 
incentivizing customer switching by paying for the switching costs would be too costly since the 
incumbent could react aggressively. 
4.  SWITCHING COSTS VALUE AND SWITCHING PROCESS 
4.1.  Sample description 
In order to determine the relevance of the different search and switching costs, an online survey 
was conducted that allowed to obtain data on consumption decisions by Portuguese customers.
5 
The  sample  of  1000  respondents  represents  the  average  residential  customer  of 
telecommunications services in Portugal stratified by region, age, gender and social class.  
Of these 1000 respondents, 86% subscribe to fixed services, 57% of which in a bundled offer and 
43% individually. Regarding broadband services, the subscription rate is also 96%, but from these, 
57% subscribe it in a bundled offer and only 43% subscribe it individually. Finally, and concerning 
mobile services, there is a 96% subscription rate, but only 2% of which in a bundled offer. 
In the next two sections, the results related with mobile voice customers will be presented.  
4.2.  Switching costs 
In the survey customers were firstly asked about the monthly savings they would require from a 
new service provider to switch from their current provider, considering that number portability was 
not available.  
If the savings demanded by mobile customers to switch provider are taken as an indicator of the 
switching costs, it can be concluded that these are extremely high. In fact, according to Fig. 1, the 
switching  costs  amount  to  13.58  euros.  In  other  words,  and  given  that  the  average  monthly 
expenditure with mobile voice services is equal to 23.29 euros, switching costs are equivalent to 
57% of the expenditure with these services (see Fig. 2).
6 In case number portability is available to 
customers, i.e., if customers can keep their mobile number when switching provider, switching 
costs are reduced to 10.25 euros, or 44% of the average monthly spending (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2).  
                                                 
4 Note that for entry on a small scale to be profitable the cost structure must not be very heavy. 
5 The survey also aimed to characterize the situation on other telecommunications markets, like fixed  voice, 
broadband, and bundle offers.  
6 Shy (2002) develops a quick and easy method to estimate switching costs and shows that switching costs  in 
mobile voice services sector in Israel are approximately equal to the average price of a mobile phone. Fig. 1: Switching costs in euros 
Fig. 2: Switching costs as a % of the 
































The difference between the two scenarios, where only the possibility of keeping the mobile number 
is changed, allows determining the value of number portability to customers, which in this case 
corresponds to 3.33 euros or 13% of the average monthly spending. This means that more than ¼ 
of the switching costs are due to the disclosure of a new phone number.
7  
Disaggregating  switching  costs  per  age  group,  it  is  possible  to  find  that  older  mobile  voice 
customers tend to reveal lower switching costs. In fact, according to  Fig. 3, for customers aged 
between 45 and 64 years old switching costs represent 42% or 54% of the average monthly 
expenditure, depending if number portability is or is not available. On the other hand, customers 
aged between 18 and 24 present switchi ng costs of 49% and 64%, respectively.
8 The value of 
number portability is almost invariant with age. 
Regarding social classes, the middle-class customers are the ones with the highest switching costs 
(46% or 59%, depending if number portability is available or not), while the upper-class is the one 
with the lowest switching costs (42% and 54%, respectively). Yet, number portability has a lower 
value for the middle-class customers.  
Finally, and concerning the type of tariff, there are no significant differences in the switching costs 
revealed by mobile customers in the case of absence of number portability. However, if number 
portability is possible post-paid customers present slightly lower switching costs (42% vs 45%). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that number portability has a higher value for post-paid customers 
than for pre-paid ones.  
                                                 
7 There are several empirical papers that analyse number portability. For instance, Maicas et al. (2009) analyze 
the  effects  of  number  portability  in  switching  costs  in  the  Spanish  mobile  services  market  verifying  that 
consumers  who  keep  their  mobile  phone  number  have  lower  switching  costs.  Moreover,  Lee  et  al.  (2006) 
conclude that the level of switching costs on the mobile voice services sector decreased substantially in Korea 
after  the  introduction  of  number  portability.  Grzybowski  (2005)  analyses  the  impact  of  mobile  number 
portability on prices in the EU15 countries from 1998 to 2002 and concludes that competition tends to be more 
intense and prices lower in countries where mobile number portability has been introduced. 
8  Kim  (2006)  estimations  based  on  the  mobile  voice  industry  in  Korea   show  that  consumers  diverge 
substantially with respect to their preferences and the switching costs they face.  Grzybowski (2008), on the 
other hand, using a multinominal and mixed logit on British consumer panel data, shows that consumers of 
mobile services in the UK face significant switching costs which vary according  to consumer characteristics like 
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4.3.  Switching process difficulties 
In order to determine the areas where policy makers’ intervention is more urgent, customers were 
asked to score, according to a 10-grade scale, the level of effort demanded by several tasks and 
factors that constitute the switching process. These can be classified according to the categories of 
restrictive mobility factors identified in Section 2, as follows: 
(i) searching for offers 
(ii) comparing relevant offers 
 
(iii) cancelling the old contract 
(iv) celebrating a new contract 
(v) new phone number disclosure 
 
(vi) learning how to use the new service   
(vii) risk and uncertainty in terms of                  
QoS associated to the switch 
 
Customers were also asked to grade the level of effort demanded in their last switching process or, 
for those who did not switch provider, which could potentially be demanded. The comparison of the 
average grade for each of the tasks and factors with the total difficulty level  of the complete 
switching process allowed determining which remedies are more critical to implement, i.e., those 
that address the tasks that are above the total difficulty level.  
Fig. 4 presents the average effort level revealed by mobile voice customers for each of the tasks 
and factors that constitute the switching process. The task that on average is classified with the 
highest grade in terms of the effort demanded is the disclosure of a new number. This is followed 
by the fear of a decrease in the QoS. Comparing relevant offers  is also above the total difficulty 
level. Cancelling the old contract and celebrating a new one and learning how to use the new 










































Regarding  contractual  costs,  minimum  subscription  periods  and  penalties  are  not  particularly 
relevant to mobile voice customers (see Fig. 5). Indeed, around 85% of customers declared that 
they were not subject to any contractual clause, and only 5% revealed to be subject to contractual 
clauses resulting from a minimum subscription period. Note that some customers could eventually 
be subject to this type of penalties, however they were not aware of this. In this case, this does 
not constitute a switching cost. 
Finally, and concerning compatibility costs, a large majority of mobile customers have their mobile 
handset locked-in to a given network (60%), which is an indicator of the importance of this type of 
switching cost in the mobile voice services market (see Fig. 6) 
Fig. 5: Customers subject to contractual 
penalties 





Does not know No contractual clauses





Locked Unlocked Does not know
 
5.  REMEDIES TO IMPROVE MOBILE VOICE CUSTOMER SWITCHING 
Switching costs affect competition by restricting customer mobility. As a consequence, prices are 
generally  higher  and entry  is  more  difficult. It  is  then critical  for policy  makers  to design  and 
implement remedies which enhance mobile voice customers’ switching behaviour. 
Since the switching process is composed by numerous tasks and influenced by several factors, 
policy makers may need to intervene in several areas, addressing the different types of search and 
switching costs.  
In the following, several remedies will be discussed aimed to improve customer switching in the 
mobile voice services market according to the categories of mobility restrictive factors identified in 
Section 2, as well as some more general remedies. Given the results of the survey, policy makers should  primarily  focus  on  the  remedies  that  address  the  uncertainty,  the  transaction  and  the 
compatibility  costs,  as  these  were  identified  by  customers  as  being  the  most  relevant  in  the 
switching process. 
5.1.  Remedies focused on search costs 
Price comparison tools 
Price comparison tools are one of the most effective measures to address search problems. These 
tools,  which  are  usually  made  available  online,  require  the  introduction  of  a  traffic  profile  by 
customers. Then, they compare the different offers and select which fits best the introduced profile, 
i.e., the one with the lowest monthly expenditure.  
The efficiency of these tolls can be maximized if they include all the relevant prices. For instance, 
they should include, not only per minute prices, but also price per SMS and for other data services. 
The  success  of  price  comparison  tools  is  highly  dependent  of  the  way  they  are  designed.  If 
customers  find  them  complex  to  use  they  will  not  be  able  to  obtain  the  correct  output.  It  is 
therefore crucial to assure its ease of use. Another key feature respects the availability of these 
price  comparison  tools.  As  broadband  penetration  rates  are  low  among  vulnerable  customer 
groups, making these tools available only online may become a handicap. Thus, they should be 
also available offline, e.g., over the phone or in sales points.   
Finally, and to increase the reliability of customers on these tools, they should be subject to an 
accreditation  process  by  policy  makers  that  would  guarantee  the  quality,  transparency, 
accessibility, comprehensibility and availability to all.   
Quality comparison tools 
Similarly to price comparison tools, another remedy that policy makers can implement are quality 
comparison tools. These tools are important to reduce search costs as well as uncertainty costs.  
The  development  of  these  comparison  tools  would  facilitate  the  evaluation  by  customers  of 
different operators’ performance regarding a set of quality indicators. This set of indicators should 
respect some basic rules, namely they should be straightforward, the most updated possible and in 
a reasonable number. For mobile voice services, quality comparison tools could comprise some of 
the following indicators: percentage of number portability requests addressed on time, percentage 
of customers' complains dealt with on time, and percentage of customers' calls to information and 
support services answered on time. Comparative information regarding the geographic coverage 
could also be made available to customers.    
Again,  the  accreditation  of  these  comparison  tools  is  important  as  a  way  to  guarantee  the 
robustness and the accuracy of the quality measures as well as the accessibility to the majority of 
the customers. 5.2.  Remedies focused on transaction costs 
Simplifying switching processes  
The bureaucracy associated to the switching process increases transaction costs. Thus, lessening 
these  costs  is  only  possible  through  the  reduction  of  the  documents  and  actions  necessary  to 
celebrate and terminate a contract. 
Celebrating  or  cancelling  a  contract  online  or  through  client  support  numbers  can  reduce 
transaction costs. Another possible measure is the development of an online tool which, after the 
introduction of a traffic profile, selects the best offer and allows the immediate switch of providers. 
Making the switching process uniform among service providers can also contribute to the reduction 
of transaction costs.  In this sense, if all the documents and actions, independently of the service, 
are the same, customers will find it easier to change providers in subsequent switching processes. 
Standardization of contracts 
Transaction costs are also reduced by the standardization of contract terms and conditions, making 
them more legible and comprehensive. The implementation of such remedy would require policy 
makers to define guidelines concerning the information to be included in contracts and the format 
of its presentation. 
Examples of information that providers could be asked to incorporate in their contracts are: the 
services provided; the quality levels contracted; the prices and ways to obtain updated information 
about  all  the  prices  and  relevant  fees;  the  length  of  the  contract,  conditions  applicable  to  its 
renewal, suspension and cancellation; and the compensation and refund rules applicable in case of 
non-fulfilment of the quality levels contracted. The presentation of this information should follow a 
template where, for instance, the type and the size of the letter and the background colours are 
predefined.    
Number portability 
Number portability enables mobile customers to retain their phone number when changing from 
one  service  provider  to  another.  This  measure  has  been  adopted  by  policy  makers  in  several 
countries  in  order  to  reduce  transaction  costs  and  promote  competition  in  electronic 
communications markets. Notwithstanding, the relevance of number portability for customers who 
switch depends  highly  on its cost and on the time taken by service providers to carry out the 
process.
9 This was the reason why the European Commission, within the new regulatory framework 
for electronic communications, imposed the reduction of the deadlines required to complete the 
number portability process. 
The success of this remedy also depends on how it is perceived by customers. Thus, policy makers 
should enforce  number  portability rules so that operators do not delay the conclusion of the 
number portability process with the objective of discouraging customer switching. Furthermore, 
increasing the awareness of this tool is essential for its generalized adoption.    
                                                 
9  According  to  Buheler  and  Haucap  (2006)  number  portability  has  several  costs,  namely  the  direct  costs 
associated with porting the mobile number, the incremental costs of call conveyance and the costs related with 
the lack of tariff transparency. 5.3.  Remedies focused on contractual costs 
Reasonability of the minimum subscription periods and penalties 
Minimum subscription periods and the associated penalties might not always reflect the benefits in 
terms of prices and equipments offered to customers when subscribing the services. Policy makers’ 
intervention is then needed to assure that minimum subscription periods and penalties are justified 
and proportional to the benefits conceded. For instance, policy makers should guarantee that the 
monetary  value  of  the  price  rebate  or  of  the  free  handset  is  in  balance  with  the  minimum 
subscription period or the minimum consumption level contracted.  
5.4.  Remedies focused on uncertainty costs 
Publication of QoS studies and regulations 
The publication of QoS studies and the adoption of quality regulations by policy makers can reduce 
uncertainty costs. These studies and regulations not only allow customers to take more informed 
decisions, but also make service providers liable for eventual service faults. 
The usefulness of QoS studies can be improved if they include rankings for several indicators as 
well  as  a  global  ranking  system  which  facilitate  the  customer  selection.  Regarding  quality 
regulations, they should specify which quality indicators should be measured and published online 
by service providers. 
5.5.  Remedies focused on compatibility costs 
Limitations to SIM-locking 
A typical example of compatibility costs is the SIM-locking of hansets. In this case, if a customer 
wants to switch to an alternative mobile provider and keep the same handset, he usually has to 
pay a fee to the original supplier in order to unlock it.  
This practice was very relevant in the initial phase of development of the market as it allowed the 
acquisition  by  customers  of  equipments  at  lower  prices,  increasing  the  service  penetration. 
However, at the present maturation stage the advantages of SIM-locking are doubtful.  
In 2002, the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), the British sectoral regulator, commissioned a 
study to evaluate the potential costs and benefits of number portability (see OFT, 2004). This study 
identified several benefits of forbidding SIM-locking, namely: (i) it would be easier and faster to 
switch between providers; (ii) customers could split mobile services between two or more providers 
using one handset with two (or more) SIM cards which would enable them to select a preferred 
network according to a call type and the time of day; (iii) more options for call coverage and signal 
quality, as customers could switch between networks by using multiple SIM cards; (iv) competitive 
pressure on handset prices; (v) greater customer choice; (vi) greater transparency of pricing since 
handsets and tariffs could be compared separately by  customers; (vii) lower entry barriers (by 
offering  SIM-only  products,  new  entrants  could  sign  up  customers  more  quickly  after  launch, 
producing a quicker payback on start-up costs); and (viii) protection from undue restrictions in 
relation to handset subsidies. However, this study also identified disadvantages from removing SIM-locking. In particular, many 
operators compete partly on the basis of specialized handsets and services that those handsets can 
offer. If the handsets were sold unlocked there would be less incentives for providers to compete in 
this way. This could potentially have adverse consequences on innovation as operators may not 
develop services if they are not sure that they are able to retain customers. 
Given these pros and cons, the removal of SIM-locking is seen as an extreme measure, as it is 
always possible for customers to buy the same unlocked handsets at higher prices. Even so, the 
locking  period  and  the  fee  charged  to  unlock  the  handset  should  be  related  to  the  benefits 
customers have enjoyed when buying the equipment at lower prices.  
Moreover, charging a fee for unlocking a handset, even after the end of the minimum subscription 
period, does not seem to be in line with the imposition of this period, which supposedly already has 
the objective of recouping the investment made by service providers. Thus, banning the charge of 
a fee after the end of the minimum subscription period is a justifiable measure to remove this 
compatibility  cost.  Finally,  the  unlock  fee  should  take  into  account  not  only  the  price  of  the 
equipment without any subsidy, but also the time left to the end of the minimum subscription 
period.  
5.6.  General remedies  
Mobile services customer guide  
The mobile voice customer is often confronted with its ignorance and incomprehension about some 
offers’ characteristics and technologies. For instance, it might not always be obvious for customers 
what are the potentialities of the UMTS technology. In this sense, many of the restrictive factors to 
mobility,  namely  search  costs,  uncertainty  costs  and  learning  costs,  can  be  reduced  with  an 
increase in customer literacy on these issues. The development of informative campaigns is an 
efficient measure that policy makers can engage in to improve customer awareness. In particular, 
providing  to  customers,  through  multiple  channels  (e.g.  online,  in  sales  points  or  in  customer 
associations), an informative guide aimed to assist them in their service selection and daily usage 
can contribute to diminish switching costs. 
This  guide  could  describe  the  main  service  characteristics,  the  technologies  and  functionalities 
associated  to  them.  Moreover,  it  could  approach  questions  related  with  the  celebration  and 
cancellation of contracts in terms of the steps and documents required, the day-by-day usage of 
the service (e.g. how to interpret a bill, how to make a complain, what to do when the service 
fails), the number portability process and all the switching tasks. This guide could also be relevant 
in terms of customers’ protection by informing them about their rights and dues. 
Codes of conduct 
Many of the issues identified could better be solved through self-regulation. By this way, service 
providers should be given the incentives to adopt codes of conduct, developed together with policy 
makers and customer associations. These codes of conduct could include several of the remedies 
already discussed additionally to others aimed to improve customer mobility, namely: (i) supply of 
standardized sheets with information about the duration of the contract, all the applicable prices 
and quality parameters; (ii) free of charge cancellation in case of a significant change in contract conditions;  (iii)  improving  the  transparency  and  accuracy  of  billing;  (iv)  publication  of  a  best 
practice guide regarding customer's migration; and (v) adoption of the same dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This study characterizes mobile voice services markets in terms of the most important mobility 
restrictive factors for consumers, presenting some examples specific to this services and discussing 
its implications in terms of prices, market shares and entry.  
According to the results of a survey, mobile voice services customers reveal switching costs higher 
than 13 euros, which is equivalent to 57% of the average monthly expenditure with these services. 
When number portability is available, switching costs decrease to around 10 euros, or 44% of the 
average monthly expenditure. 
Considering the tasks necessary to complete the switching process, it was found that the disclosure 
of  a  new  phone  number  is  scored  with  the  highest  grade  in  terms  of  the  effort  demanded. 
Customers also showed high concern with respect to the possibility of losing QoS. The comparison 
of  offers  is  another  relevant  task  for  customers.  Compatibility  costs  are  also  imposing  high 
restrictions to customer mobility. 
Furthermore, it was identified a comprehensive set of remedies which address the most relevant 
restrictive factors with the objective of improving customer mobility. Price and quality comparison 
tools  are  the  regulatory  measures  selected  to  overcome  search  costs.  Simplifying  customers’ 
switching processes, the standardization of contracts, number portability and the increase of its 
awareness can be seen as means of addressing transaction costs. Contractual costs can be reduced 
through the guarantee by policy makers of the reasonability of the minimum subscription periods 
and penalties. The publication of QoS studies and quality regulations is the proposed remedy to 
deal  with  uncertainty  costs.  The  reduction  of  compatibility  costs  can  be  achieved  through  the 
imposition of limitations to SIM-locking. The publication of a customer guide and the adoption of 
codes of conduct are more general instruments aimed to facilitate customer’s mobility, acting over 
multiple types of search and switching costs. 
From this large set of remedies, and according to the results of the survey, policy makers should 
primarily focus on the ones that address the uncertainty, the transaction and the compatibility 
costs, as these were identified by mobile voice customers as being the most relevant ones in the 
switching process. 
REFERENCES 
Beggs A. and Klemperer, P., 1992, Multiperiod Competition with Switching Costs, Econometrica, 
60(3), 651-666. 
 
Buehler, S. and Haucap, J., 2006, Mobile number portability, Journal of Industry, Competition and 
Trade, 4(3), 223-238. 
 
Cabral, L., 2008, Small Switching Costs Lead to Lower Prices, mimeo. 
 
Chen,  Y.,  1997,  Paying  Customers  to Switch.  Journal  of  Economics and  Management  Strategy, 
6(4), 877-897.  
Doganoglu,  T.,  2010,  Switching  Costs,  Experience  Goods  and  Dynamic  Price  Competition, 
Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 8(2), 167-205. 
 
European Commission, 2009a, Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0136:EN:NOT 
 
European  Commission,  2009b,  Flash  Eurobarometer  243  about  Consumer's  views  on  switching 
service providers, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/facts_eurobar_en.htm. 
 
Farrel, J. and Klemperer, P., 2007, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs 
and  Network  Effects,  Handbook  of  Industrial  Organization,  vol.  3.  Amsterdam:  North  Holland 
Publishing. 
 
Farrel,  J.  and  Shapiro,  C.,  1988,  Dynamic  Competition  with  Switching  Costs,  Rand  Journal  of 
Economics, 19(1), 123-137. 
 
Grzybowski, L., 2005,  Regulation of Mobile Telephony across the European Union: An empirical 
analysis, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 28(1), 47-67. 
 
Grzybowski,  L.,  2008,  Estimating  Switching  Costs  in  Mobile  Telephony  in  the  UK,  Journal  of 
Industrial Competition Trade, 8, 113–132. 
 
Kim,  J.,  2006,  Consumers'  Dynamic  Switching  Decisions  in  the  Cellular  Service  Industry,  NET 
Institute Working Paper 06-24. 
 
Klemperer, P., 1987a, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
102(2), 375-394. 
 
Klemperer,  P.,  1987b,  Entry  Deterrence  in  Markets  with  Consumer  Switching  Costs,  Economic 
Journal (Supplement), 97(0), 99-117. 
 
Klemperer,  P.,  1995,  Competition  when  Consumers  have  Switching  Costs,  Review  of  Economic 
Studies, 62(4), 515-539. 
 
Lee, J., Kim, Y., Lee, J-D. and Park, Y., 2006, Estimating the extent of potential competition in the 
Korean mobile telecommunications market: Switching costs and number portability, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, 107– 124. 
 
Maicas,  J.P.,  Polo,  Y.  and  Sese,  F.J.,  2009,  “Reducing  the  level  of  switching  costs  in  mobile 
communications: The case of Mobile Number Portability”, Telecommunications Policy, 33(9) 544-
554. 
 
OFCOM, 2009, The consumer experience – Research Report, Office of Communications. 
 
OFT, 2003, Switching costs, Economic Discussion Paper 5, Office of Fair Trading. 
 
Shy, O., 2002, A quick-and-easy method for estimating switching costs, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 20, 71–87. 
 